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Noble: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as the Law of the Land

THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
AS THE LAW OF THE LAND.
I. INTRODUCTION

More than three decades ago, at the United Nations San Francisco Conference, President Truman announced that "we have good reason to expect

the framing of an international bill of rights acceptable to all nations involved. That bill of rights will be as much a part of international life as our
own Bill of Rights is a part of our own Constitution." 1 While the expectation of the framing of an international bill of rights has been realized in the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3 the United States has
lagged far behind other nations 4 in making these Covenants "as much a part
of international life as our own Bill of Rights is a part of our own Constitution." 5 Although both of these Covenants were opened for signature in
1966 and entered into force in 1976,6 to date, neither Covenant includes the
United States as a member party.
In a speech before the United Nations in March, 1977, President Carter

stated that he will urge congressional approval of these Covenants. 7 Both

1. United Nations Conference on InternationalOrganization Documents, Doc. 1209, p/19,
1 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 683 (1945).
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (entered into force March 23,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. The Covenant entered into
force pursuant to its own terms three months after the date of deposit of the 35th instrument of
ratification or instrument of accession. See id. art. 49.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights]. The
Covenant entered into force pursuant to its own terms three months after the date of deposit of
the 35th instrument of ratification or instrument of accession. See id. art. 27.
4. Among the parties to both the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, and
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 3, are the United Kingdom
of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia, Ukrania Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE
SECRETARY GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS 95-106 (1977).
5. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
6. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
7. 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 329, 332 (1977). The President stated:
The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights. The United States has a historical birthright to be associated with
this process.
...To demonstrate [the commitment of the United States to human rights] I will
seek congressional approval and sign the U.N. covenants on economic, social and cultural
rights and the covenants on civil and political rights. And I will work closely with our own
Congress in seeking to support the ratification not only of these two instruments but the
United Nations Genocide Convention and the Treaty for the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination as well.
Id.

(119)
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Covenants have been signed by the United States and on February 23,
1978, President Carter delivered them to the Senate for advice and consent
to ratification. 8 Doubtless much heated debate will be generated when, and
if, they are introduced in the Senate since this has been the case in the
senatorial debates during the more recent, largely unsuccessful hearings on
other human rights treaties, such as the Genocide Convention. 9 Indeed, in
recent years, human rights treaties have generally fared poorly in the Senate lO despite the fact that Americans have often been key influences in the
drafting of these conventions. It seems anomalous that a "world-recognized"
leader in causes relating to human rights, a nation born out of a determination to exercise freely the inalienable rights so boldly proclaimed by the
Founding Fathers in the Declaration of Independence, should fail to be a
party to international promises of human rights protection.
Historically, the United States has not hesitated in becoming a party to
treaties concerned with the rights of individuals. For example, one of the
first treaties entered into by the United States, the Definitive Treaty of
Peace with Great Britain," stated that "no Person shall suffer future Loss or
Damage either in his Person, Liberty or Property on account of his participation in the Revolutionary War." 12 This was followed by other treaties

8. 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. 4 (1979).

9. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277. The Genocide Convention was before the Senate both in 1950 at the request
of President Truman, 29 DEP'T STATE BULL. 844 (1949), and in 1970 upon the urging of the
Nixon administration, 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 350 (1970). Despite extended hearings on both
occasions, no vote was ever taken. See Hearings on Executive 0, The Genocide Convention,
Before a Subcomm. on the Genocide Convention Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-20, 22-52, 154, 202, 205-08 (1950); 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14, 147-61
(1970).
10. In 1963 President Kennedy sent the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, The Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slave Trade, April 30, 1957,
266 U.N.T.S. 3, and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, March 31, 1953, 193
U.N.T.S. 135, to the Senate with a letter urging the Senate to consent to their ratification. 49
DEP'T STATE BULL. 23 (1963). It was not until 1967 that hearings were held on these documents. See Hearings on Executive J, K, and L, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); id. Part 2 (1967). Of these conventions only the Supplementary Slavery Convention
was approved by the Senate. See 113 CONG. REG. 30758-62, 30902-09 (1967). This was the
first United Nations Human Rights Convention approved by the Senate. For a general discussion of congressional action with respect to such treaties, see L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 968-69 (1972).

One Senator made the following comments concerning the failure of the Senate to act on
the Convention on the Political Rights of Women:
The Human Rights Convention on the Political Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December of 1952.
It was opened for signature on March of 1953, 14 years ago. As in the case of every
Human Rights Convention, the Senate has failed to ratify the Convention on Political
Rights of Women. President Kennedy sent this convention to the Senate 4 full years ago.
Result: no action by this body.
113 CONG. REG. 6780 (1967) (Remarks of Sen. Proxmire).

11. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 80-83,
T.S. No. 104.
12. Id. art. VI.
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which provided for such freedoms as the right to dispose of property upon
death, 13 the right to counsel under the sixth amendment,' 4 and equal protection rights. 15 In an article on international protection of human rights,
Professor Bitker points to these early treaties as demonstrating that "concern
for human rights by treaty is traditionally American." 16 Accordingly, the
United States' endorsement of the recent treaties dealing with human rights
would be consistent with this tradition. However, despite this tradition and
the urgings of Presidents Truman, 17 Kennedy,' Nixon,' 9 and Carter, 2 0 the
Senate has shown strong opposition to United States involvement in such
multilateral agreements by refusing to consent to United Nations documents, 21 and by attempting a constitutional amendment of the treaty power
22
through the proposed Bricker Amendment.
The purpose of this comment is to consider the constitutional arguments
which have been raised by critics of American involvement in international
human rights treaties, and to weigh the validity of the constitutional caveat
to United States ratification. Part I of this comment will deal with the debate
over the constitutional implications of treaty-making in general, while Part II
will focus upon the constitutionality and merits of various provisions of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
II.

HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY POWER

It is submitted that a determination of the scope of the treaty power is
essential when debating the wisdom of entrance into human rights agreements. Opponents of such agreements have asserted that the scope of the
treaty power is so broad that treaties may interfere with constitutionally pro-

13. Convention for the Extension of Certain Stipulations Contained in the Treaty of August
27, 1829, May 8, 1848, United States-Austria, arts. I, II, 9 Stat. 944-48, T.S. No. 8.
14. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 12, 1828, United StatesBrazil, art. XII, 8 Stat. 390-98, T.S. No. 34.
15. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, May 13, 1858, United StatesBolivia, art. III, 12 Stat. 1003-22, T.S. No. 32.
16. Bitker, The Constitutionality of InternationalAgreements on Human Rights, 12 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 279, 280 (1972).
17. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
18. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
19. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
20. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
21. See generally L. SOHN & T. BUERGANTHAL, supra note 10, at 913-34.
22. See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. I and 43 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-12, 823-27 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Treaties]. The constitutional amendment proposed by Senator Bricker provided,
inter alia, that a treaty which denied or abridged the constitutional rights of United States
citizens should be of no force or effect. Id. For a compilation of the various texts of the proposed "Bricker Amendment," see W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
110-12 (3d ed. 1971). See also L. SOHN & T. BUERGANTHAL, supra note 10, at 948-61.
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tected rights. 23 Thus, this section will examine the arguments made for
and against human rights treaties in terms of the proper reach of the treaty
power.
A. Constitutional Analysis
One source of opposition to entrance by the United States into international human rights agreements has been the supremacy clause of the Constitution which provides: "The Constitution and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
Supreme Law of the Land ....
24
This clause has been construed to mean that while laws of the United
States must be made in pursuance of the Constitution, the treaty power is not
subject to that limitation. 2 5 For example, concern that the Genocide Convention 2 6 would interfere with the rights of freedom of speech and of the
press, and the rights of the criminal defendant, led the American Bar Association to campaign against its ratification. 2 7 Moreover, the Bricker
Amendment 28 sought to invalidate treaty provisions which deny or abridge
any right enumerated in the Constitution. While the proposed amendment
failed, hearings regarding it generated considerable debate which evidenced
a fear on the part of some senators that treaty provisions may supersede the
Constitution. 29 A year prior to the hearings, the future Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, stated that treaties are "more supreme than ordinary
laws, for Congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution .

.

. [while] treaties can .
30

.

. cut across the rights given the people

by the Constitution."
This proposition that treaties are not subject to other constitutional provisions has been strongly refuted by the commentators. Louis Henkin, for
instance, considers such an interpretation of the treaty power to be a
"myth."31 Nevertheless, the belief that the treaty power is not limited by
23. See generally note 22 supra. See also notes 27-30 and accompanying text infra.
24. U.S. CONST. art VI.
25. See generally note 22 supra. See also notes 27-30 and accompanying text infra. The fact
that one version of the Bricker Amendment failed by only one vote to receive the two-thirds
majority of the Senate required for passage is evidence of the pervasiveness of this interpretation of the supremacy clause. See 100 CONG. REC. 2349-58, 2364-75 (1954).
26. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
27. See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTAHL, supra note 10, at 951. Frank Holeman, then President of the American Bar Association, criticized the move toward ratification of the Genocide
Convention and other such treaties, claiming that the agreements contradicted the American
concept of inalienable rights by purporting to grant, rather than protect, human rights. Holeman, International ProposalsAffecting So-Called Human Rights, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
479, 482 (1949).
28. See note 22 supra.
29. See Treaties, supra note 22, at 1-12, 823-27.
30. Id. (remarks of Senator Bricker quoting John Foster Dulles).
31. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 137 (1972). See also Gardner, A
Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A. J. 907, 907 (1965).
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the Constitution appears to have been a large factor in the failure of the
32
United States to enter into the United Nations treaties.
Although there is no United States Supreme Court decision directly
holding that the treaty power is limited by the Constitution, there is dicta
which recognized such a limitation. In Geofroy v. Riggs, 33 the Court stated:
"It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to
34
authorize what the Constitution forbids .
35
Similarly, in Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court addressed the
extent of the treaty power. In that case the State of Missouri brought suit to
enjoin the enforcement of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain which permitted the federal government to regulate activities affecting
migratory birds. 36 Missouri claimed that the treaty violated the tenth
amendment 3 7 in that it infringed upon the state's property rights and
sovereign powers. 38 Earlier decisions of the district courts had invalidated
acts of Congress which attempted to regulate the killing of migratory birds as
an improper exercise of power over birds owned by the states in their
sovereign capacity. 39 The Holland Court distinguished those decisions,
however, on the ground that the statute involved in Holland had been
enacted by Congress pursuant to a treaty. 4 0 The Court stated: "It is obvious
that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well
being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed
by such an act could .... .41
Nevertheless, in upholding the treaty, the
Supreme Court was careful to note in dictum that the "treaty in question
does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitu42
tion."
The scope of the treaty power was also addressed in United States v.
Pink,4 3 and in United States v. Belmont,4 4 but in the context of a presiden-

32. See notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.
33. 133 U.S. 258 (1889).
34. Id. at 267.
35. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
36. id. at 430-31.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." Id.
38. 252 U.S. at 431.
39. See, e.g., United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 296 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v.
Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
40. 252 U.S. at 432-34.
41. Id. at 433.
42. Id.
43. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). Pink involved a dispute between the United States and Louis Pink,
Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, over the assets of a dissolved Russian
corporation remaining after payment of all domestic creditors. Id. at 210. Previously, the Russian government had nationalized its insurance industry. Id. Incident to its recognition by the
United States in 1933, the Russian government, pursuant to a presidential agreement known as
the Litvinov -Assignment, had assigned to the United States all Soviet claims to property held
by American citizens. Id. at 211. The Supreme Court held 1) that by the nationalization decree,
the property in question became vested in the Russian government; 2) that the right of the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 7
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 25: p. 119

tial agreement known as the Litvinov Assignment. In those cases, the Court,
in upholding the presidential agreement, assumed that it was subject to the
limitations of the fifth amendment. 45 It is questionable, however, whether a
presidential agreement has the same constitutional status as a treaty. A treaty
is an agreement made by the President with the "advice and consent" of the
Senate, requiring a two-thirds vote to be put into effect. 4 6 In contrast, a
presidential agreement is entered into by the President alone. 47 Moreover,
there is no mention in the supremacy clause of presidential agreements.
Therefore, it may be argued that, although agreements such as those in Pink
and Belmont are subject to constitutional limitations, 48 treaties are not.
Nonetheless, the Court in Pink broadly stated that "[a] treaty is a 'Law of
the Land' under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar
dignity." 4 9 According to one commentator, the peculiar facts of the decisions dealing with the Litvinov Assignment mitigate the extreme statements
50
of this opinion.
In Reid v. Covert, 51 another case involving a presidential agreement,
the Court made what may well be its strongest statement on the treaty
power and its constitutional limitations. In Reid, the defendant was tried and
52
convicted of murder by a United States military court in Great Britain

Russian government passed to the United States under the Litvinov Assignment; and 3) that the
United States was entitled to the property as against those who presently possessed it. Id. at
234. In so holding, the Court assumed that enforcing the presidential agreement did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. Id. at 228.
44. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). In Belmont, the Supreme Court confronted a challenge to the same
presidential agreement which was at issue in Pink. The Court in Belmont upheld the presidential agreement with Russia assigning to the United States all Soviet claims to property held by
American citizens. The basis of the decision was that the agreement did not impinge on the fifth
amendment rights of the plaintiffs not to have their property taken without just compensation.
Id. at 332. The Court in Belmont, as in Pink, implied that the presidential agreement would
have been held invalid if it had violated any provision of the Constitution. Id.
45. See notes 43 & 44 supra. The relevant portion of the fifth amendment provides: "No
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The term "treaty" has been defined by one commentator as
"any international agreement, however denominated, which becomes binding upon the United
States through ratification by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, twothirds of the Senators present and concurring therein." W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 86 (1962).
47. Id. at 86-87.
48. See notes 43 & 44 supra.
49. 315 U.S. at 230, quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI.
50. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MINN. L. REV.
709, 769 (1958). Professor McLaughlin states: "When taken within the peculiar facts of these
cases to apply to an executive agreement incidental to the President's admitted right to recognize a foreign state the extremeness of this position is mitigated, but not altogether removed."
id.
51. 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
52. Id. at 3.
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under a presidential agreement 53 which "permitted United States military
courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great
Britain by American servicemen and their dependents." 54 The constitutional protection provided by the Bill of Rights, including the right to trial
by jury, was not applied to the proceedings before the military court. The
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, affirmed the federal district court's
reversal of the conviction, holding that the Constitution in its entirety
applied to the trial:
There is nothing in [the supremacy clause] which intimates that
treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply
with provisions of the Constitution . . . . It would be manifestly
contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as
well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let
alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition-to
construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise
power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions . . . . The prohibitions of the Constitution
were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government
and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive
55
and Senate combined.
Nevertheless, since only four justices clearly held that the prohibitions of the
Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the government, 56 the
issue whether treaties are subject to constitutional limitations based on the
supremacy clause cannot be definitively resolved on the basis of case law
alone.
Outside of the supremacy clause arguments, support for the position
that treaties are subject to other provisions of the Constitution can be found
in Marbury v. Madison.5 7 There the Supreme Court established the overriding importance of the Constitution in holding that this document was ordained by the people as the fundamental law to which all statutes enacted

53. Executive Agreement of July 27, 1942, United States-Great Britain-Northern Ireland, 57
Stat. 1193, E.A.S. No. 355.
54. 354 U.S. at 15.
55. Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
56. In a concurring opinion in Reid, Justice Frankfurter concluded that in capital cases, the
exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents in time of peace cannot be justified by the power of Congress under article I to regulate land and naval forces, when considered in light of the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant. 354 U.S. at 49 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). In a separate concurrence, Justice Harlan concluded that with respect to capital
offenses, article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 506, art. 2, § 11, 64
Stat. 108 (1950), "cannot constitutionally be applied to the trial of civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas in times of peace." 3,54 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring). It
is not known how the two concurring Justices would have held had the offense not been capital,
or to what extent the seriousness of the crime and the concomitant potential deprivation of the
defendant's liberty influenced their decisions.
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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thereunder are to be subordinated."8 Thus, it is submitted that the requirement of constitutionality should exist for treaties as it does for statutes.
Although this position has never been explicitly adopted by the Supreme
Court, it seems that treaties should be consistent with constitutional protections considering that the Constitution is the fundamental law from which
the treaty power is derived. 59 It would be anomolous to claim that a treaty
could override the document from which the power to make it emanates.
Further support for this proposition can be found in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,60 where the Supreme Court stated that the
power of the President, as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations, "like every other governmental power, must
be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." 61 Therefore, it is submitted that language in Supreme Court decisions and the structure of the Constitution form the basis for strong arguments that the treaty power is limited by the Constitution.
B. Pragmatic Analysis
Another obstacle to the acceptance of human rights treaties is the belief
that the Constitution prohibits treaties from dealing with domestic matters.
The treaty power, it has been asserted, only covers international subjects, to
the exclusion of domestic matters.6 2 Certainly the rights to be accorded
citizens are a domestic concern; however, it is submitted that to separate the
internal and external affairs of a .modern nation is to ignore the necessary
63
concurrence of these interests.
The Supreme Court shed some light on the issue of whether the treaty
power extends to domestic affairs in Santovincenzo v. Egan,6" where the
Court stated that the treaty power is
broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our
foreign relations, [including] . . . the rights and privileges of citi-

58. Id. at 176-77.
59. See McLaughlin, supra note 50, at 740.
60. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
61. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
62. Phillips & Deutsch, Pitfalls of the Genocide Convention, 56 A.B.A. J. 641, 642 (July
1970).
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 117, Comment b (1965). Commment b provides: "Matters of international concern are not confined to matters exclusively concerned with foreign relations. Usually, matters of international
concern have both international and domestic effects." Id.
64. 284 U.S. 30 (1931). Santovincenzo involved a treaty between the United States and Italy
which provided that upon the death of a citizen or subject of either of the countries within the
territories of the other, his effects, if the decedent lacked next of kin and died intestate, would
be delivered to the nation of which the deceased was a subject or citizen. Id. at 35-36. The
Supreme Court held that the United States, under the treaty-making power, may determine the
disposition of property of aliens, and that such an agreement would supersede the conflicting
law of any state. Id. at 40.
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zens of the United States in foreign countries, and of the nationals
of such countries within the United States, and the disposition of
the property of aliens dying within the territory of the respective

parties ....

65

The question remains, however, as to what subjects outside of the three
areas delineated by the Santovincenzo Court are properly an international
concern. Specifically, do international human rights agreements fit within
the reach of the treaty power?
Traditionally, international law regulated individual rights of aliens but
did not deal with the rights of citizens in relation to their own state. 66 The
Nuremburg Tribunal, 6 7 however, established that the relation of a government to its own citizens is also amenable to international regulation. 68 This
precedent is followed in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 69 insofar
as it regulates the treatment of all individuals within the borders of member
States, both citizens and aliens. 70 By participating in and espousing the
views of the Nuremburg Tribunal, it is submitted that the United States has
established precedent for joining international agreements that protect the
political and civil rights of its citizens. Thus, the scope of the treaty power is
arguably broad enough to include certain areas not formerly considered to
be of international concern.
It is submitted that this expanded view of the scope of the treaty power
is a result of the growing interdependency of the world's peoples. 7 1 It is
this growing interdependency, it is suggested, that has made such agreements a necessary ingredient of world peace. Professors MacDougal and
Leighton 72 state: "It is a commonplace in a world threatened by new war
and atomic destruction that all peoples everywhere are today interdependent
for securing all their basic demands, that mankind today lives in what is in
fact a world community.'" 73 This wane of isolationism, however, does not

65. Id. at 40. See also Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making
power vested in our government extends to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments"); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) ("The treaty power of the United States
extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the governments of
other nations").
66. See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 334 (1970).
67. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (1945-46).
The text of the proceedings can be found in THE LAw OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
vol. 2 (L. Friedman ed. 1972).
68. See generally id.
69. For a discussion of the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see note
2 supra; notes 85-88 and accompanying text infra.
70. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 2, § 1. Section 1 provides:
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant." Id.
71. See MacDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 490 (1949).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 493. See also note 77 and accompanying text infra.
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diminish the importance of individual nation-states. As Professors MacDougal
and Leighton maintain: "How power is structured internally in a nationstate, how the individual human being is related to centrally organized coercion, affects very directly how the nation-state seeks to exercise power in the
world arena, whether by violence or by peaceful procedures." 74 Thus, in
view of the potential for world strife arising from the disregard of individual
human rights, international human rights treaties are advocated as a necessary mechanism whereby stability and security may be brought to the world
75
community.
Based on this view, commentators have suggested pragmatic tests, outside the language of the Constitution and the courts, for determining the
proper scope of the treaty power. To Professors MacDougal and Leighton,
the fundamental issue is whether human rights and security are sufficiently
at stake to justify the United States' assuming the obligations demanded by
the particular treaty in return for other nation-states' assuming reciprocal
obligations. 76 Professor Gardner, on the other hand, finds this threshold
question unncessary since, in his view, guarantees of human rights are essential to world order. 77 The current unwillingness of the United States to
participate in international covenants is, according to Professor Gardner, a
"costly anachronism." 7
Thus, it is submitted that whether applying the
analysis of Professors MacDougal and Leighton or that of Professor Gardner,
the protection of human rights is no longer a matter of mere altruism; it is a
fundamental requisite for peace. The great potential for world peace that
exists when nations exchange promises to set and to meet high standards in
the treatment of their citizens cannot be denied. In the words of President
Kennedy, peace is, "in the last analysis, basically a matter of human
rights." 79
C. Immediate Benefits of Entrance into the Covenant
Besides the goal of peace through internationalizing human rights, other
more immediate consequences have been cited as likely to flow from United
States' ratification of human rights treaties. The United States would be in a
better legal and moral position to prevent infringement of the Covenants by

74. MacDougal & Leighton, supra note 71, at 493.
75. The history of Nazi Germany illustrates the potential for international strife which is
created when one nation within the world community violates the fundamental rights of individuals. Such a nation has a strong motive to engage in aggression abroad in order to turn the
national consciousness away from domestic suffering and toward the aggrandizement and glorification of the state. As Professor Gardner observes: "Dictators typically employ foreign adventure to solidify their domestic power .
Gardner, supra note 31, at 908.
76. MacDougal & Leighton, supra note 71, at 506.
77. Gardner, supra note 31, at 908.
78. Id. at 907.
79. Address by President John F. Kennedy, American University Commencement,
Washington, D.C. (June 10, 1963), reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT: JOHN F.
KENNEDY 1963, at 459-64, quoted in Gardner, supra note 31, at 910.
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other ratifying countries.8 0 Ratification will also increase the United States'
81
The United States
influence in the drafting of legal norms in this area.
its tradiexpanding
in
leader
would thus be able to assume its role as world
forum of
relevant
and
direct
more
in
the
tional support of basic human rights
the United Nations.
III. THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AMIDST THE TREATY
POWER AND CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

This section will focus on two specific issues pertaining to the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: 1) whether the provisions of the Covenant conflict with the United States Constitution; and 2) if conflicts do exist, whether
they can be cured by a reservation 82 or an understanding.8 3 Before discussing the potential constitutional debates, a general explanation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is in order. The Covenant is a statement of
the civil and political rights which member states are to ensure their citizens. The notion of "inalienable rights"-paralleling the concept of individual rights in the Declaration of Independence of the United Statespervades the treaty.8 4 The preamble to the Covenant states that recognition
of the "rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world," 8s 5 and that "these rights derive from
the inherent dignity of the human person." 8 6 Although the Covenant provides for suspension of the treaty in time of an officially proclaimed public
emergency that threatens the life of the nation,8 7 the Covenant prohibits
even the temporary denial of certain specified rights.88 This approach is in
keeping with the "inalienable rights" concept espoused by the Covenant.

80. Gardner, supra note 31, at 908.
81. Id.
82. A "reservation" is a stipulation made by a ratifying state indicating that it will not abide
by one or more of the provisions of the treaty becuase of conflicting domestic law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 124 (1965). Reserva-

tions are also appropriate when a state is unwilling to expand or change its present law in order
to comply with treaty expectations. A state may not formulate a reservation that is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
19, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (March 26-May 24, 1968; April 19-May
22, 1969) 289, U.N. Doc. A/39-27 (conf.) (1969).
83. If a reservation is not appropriate, an "understanding" may be made. An understanding
is a stipulation as to the signatory nation's interpretation of a specific provision which need not
be assented to by other parties, and which is effective as between those parties who agree to
that interpretation. See BISHOP, supra note 22, at 98-99.
84. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, passim.
85. Id., preamble.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
88. Id. art. 4, para. 2. These rights are as follows: the right to life, id. art. 6, paras. 1, 2;
freedom from torture, id. art. 7; freedom from retroactive criminal laws, id. art. 15, para. 1;
freedom from imprisonment for civil debt, id. art. 11; the right to be recognized as a person
before the law, id. art. 16; and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Id.
art. 18.
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The basic assumption of the treaty that human rights are inalienable and
must be protected has long been strongly supported by the Constitution and
the history of the United States. As to the enumerated rights which member
states agree to enforce, Professor McLaughlin contends that "it can be stated
with some confidence that the rights enumerated in the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights are not inconsistent with those protected in the United
States, with the possible exception of. . . the 'right of self-determination.' "89 Professor MacChesney claims that although some of the
proposed articles differ from comparable provisions in our Bill of Rights, 90
the interests of the United States may be protected by an article in the
Covenant which provides that nothing in the document will lower existing
standards in any country. 91 It is submitted, however, that the assertions of
Professors McLaughlin and MacChesney may not be accurate since several
provisions of the Covenant are arguably inconsistent with the Constitution.
A. Equal Rights
The scope of the Covenant's protection of equal rights is, it is
suggested, difficult to ascertain. In article 2, the nations which are parties to
the treaty undertake to ensure all individuals "the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." 92 There is some question as to whether the
words "without distinction" are to be taken literally.
It is submitted that a literal interpretation of the Covenant provision
forbidding distinction on the basis of sex would not be in harmony with
Supreme Court cases upholding statutes that treat men and women differently. 93 Historically, until the early 1970's, gender-based discrimination
was held to be constitutional. 94 For example, Supreme Court decisions let
stand 1) a statute limiting the hours women were permitted to work; 95 2) a

89. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States I1, 43 MINN. L. REv.
651, 699 (1959).
90. See notes 92-181 and accompanying text infra.
91. MacChesney, InternationalProtection of Human Rights in The United Nations, 47 Nw.
U.L. REv. 198, 216 (1952). Professor MacChesney was referring to article 5 of the Covenant
which states: "There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental
human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant . . . on the
pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a
lesser extent." Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 20.
92. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 1.
93. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). For a
discussion of these cases, see notes 110-16 and accompanying text infra.
94. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 95-97 and
accompanying text infra.
95. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924). The Radice Court stated:
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the
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statute which included on jury lists only women who volunteered, while
men were required to serve;96 and 3) a statute prohibiting women from
working as barmaids unless a wife or daughter of the owner. 97 In each of
these cases the Court required only a showing of rational purpose for the
statute to meet constitutional standards, and a legislative purpose to protect
the role of women as the center of home and family life was considered to
be sufficiently rational. 98
In this decade, the Court has struck down an increasing number of
sexually discriminatory statutes, but no clear pattern has yet emerged. One
line of cases, including Reed v. Reed 99 and Frontiero v. Richardson,' 00 has
demonstrated a departure by the Court from its previous tolerance of
gender-based discrimination by the government. In Reed, the Court overturned a statute that gave preference to men, over equally qualified women,
in granting administration over a deceased's estate. 1 1 The statute struck
down in Frontiero permitted female members of the armed forces to claim
their spouses as dependents only upon a showing that the husbands received
over one-half of their support from their wives; male members, on the other
hand, were not required to make any such showing in order to claim their
spouses as dependents. 10 2 Applying what was purportedly a rationality
standard, subsequent decisions have held that social security payments could
not be awarded only to widows and not to widowers; 103 and that a statute
requiring parental support payments to be made for boys up to the age of
21, but for girls only up to the age of 18, is unconstitutional.10 4
To date, the Court has not consistently applied a "strict scrutiny"
test 105 to sex-based classifications. Instead, varying levels of rationality have

amount of physical strength, in the capacity of long-continued labor, particularly when
done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race,
the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain
the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation.
Id. at 295, quoting Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). The Court further stated that
"[t]he inequality produced in order to encounter the challenge of the Constitution, must be
'actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.' " 264 U.S. at 296, quoting Arkansas Natural
Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 261 U.S. 379, 384 (1923).
96. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
97. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
98. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961). Justice Harlan, writing for the Court,
stated: "Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of
bygone years . . . woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." Id.
99. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
100. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
101. 404 U.S. at 77.
102. 411 U.S. at 690-91.
103. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642-43 (1975).
104. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975).
105. The strict scrutiny standard is applied by the Supreme Court in reviewing "classifications which touch upon fundamental constitutional values or use a criterion for classification
which itself violates a fundamental constitutional value." NOWACK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 524 (1978). In applying the strict scrutiny test, "the justices
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been required for the classification scheme to be found constitutional.' 0 6 In
Craig v. Boren, 10 7 for instance, the Court departed from the mere rationality standard but did not go so far as to apply a strict scrutiny test: "[T]o
withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications
by gender must be substantially related to achievement of these objectives. "108
In another line of cases, however, the Supreme Court has clearly upheld statutes treating men and women distinctly. 10 9 For instance, in Kahn
v. Shevin, 110 the Court upheld a provision of a Florida statute granting
widows, but not widowers, an annual property tax exemption of five
hundred dollars."' Also sustained, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,112 were a pair
of federal statutes 113 which provided that, having twice been passed over for
promotion, a male officer would be mandatorily discharged regardless of the
length of his service, whereas a woman officer could be discharged under
identical circumstances only after she had served a minimum of thirteen
years. 114 This line of cases also includes a decision upholding a provision in
the Social Security Act that permitted retired women to receive higher benefits than retired men, 115 and a decision permitting a state to bar women
1 16
from working as guards in contact areas in all-male penitentiaries.
The phrase "without distinction" in article 2 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights seems to demand a greater measure of equality than the
Supreme Court has been willing to afford. Moreover, article 3 of the Covenant provides that "[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and
political rights set forth in the present Covenant," 117 while article 26
guarantees equal protection before the law." 8 Thus, it is submitted that
the Covenant's provisions relating to sex discrimination appear broad enough

will not defer to the decision of the other branches of government but will instead independently determine the degree of relationship which the classification bears to a constitutionally
compelling end." Id.
106. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (four Justices applied strict
scrutiny analysis) with Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974) (mere rationality standard
applied). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (departure from mere rationality standard, although Court did not apply strict scrutiny standard); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(same).
107. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
108. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
109. See cases cited note 93 supra; notes 110-27 and accompanying text infra.
110. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
111. Id. at 355.
112. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
113. 10 U.S.C. §§ 6382, 6401 (1976).
114. 419 at 510.
115. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
116. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
117. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 3.
118. Id. art. 26. Article 26 provides: "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law." id.
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to prohibit any discrimination on the basis of sex and would, therefore, be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's sex discrimination decisions.'

19

A second area in which the equal protection provisions of the Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights may provide a higher standard of protection
than is provided under the Constitution is that of the rights afforded to
aliens. Article 2 of the Covenant ensures to all individuals within the territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the member states the rights enumer-

ated in the document "without distinction of any kind, such as . . . national
or social origin." 120
Historically, state statutes discriminating against aliens were upheld by
the Supreme Court on the grounds that the public interest required less
favorable treatment of noncitizens in order to protect the welfare of citizens. 1 2 1 Thus, the Court upheld state requirements that contractors en-

22
gaged in constructing public works employ only United States citizens,1

that only citizens may be licensed to operate pool rooms, 123 and that aliens
may not own land for the purpose of farming.1 24 This public interest justification is no longer constitutionally adequate for, in recent years, the Court
1 25
has invalidated statutes classifying individuals on the basis of alienage.

For example, aliens have successfully challenged statutes denying welfare
benefits to noncitizens, 126 excluding aliens from practicing law, 127 and permitting only American citizens to hold permanent positions in the competi-

tive class of a state civil service. 128
Recent cases, however, make it clear that not all discrimination against
aliens violates the fourteenth amendment.1 29

For instance, in 1973, the

119. It could be argued that the ratification of the Covenant is tantamount to passage of an
equal rights amendment. Professor Tribe suggests that "the Supreme Court's failure to articulate clearer principles in the area of gender discrimination may be explained in part by the
Court's reluctance to overstep what it conceives to be the bounds between constitutional interpretation and constitutional amendment." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITuTIONAL LAw 1074
(1978). However, ratification of the Covenant would render gender-based discrimination legally
impermissible, thereby accomplishing by treaty that which is not compelled by the Constitution
as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
120. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 1.
121. See, e.g., Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197 (1923); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). For a discussion of these cases, see notes
122-24 and accompanying text infra.
122. See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 195 (1915).
123. See Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396 (1927).
124. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216 (1923).
125. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). For a discussion of these cases, see notes
126-30 and accompanying text infra.
126. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 370-78 (1971).
127. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-29 (1973).
128. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 638-43 (1973).
129. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (dictum). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 130-34 and accompanying text infra.
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Court stated in dictum that states can constitutionally bar aliens from voting
and from holding state elective or important nonelective offices. 130 In the
1976 case of Matthews v. Diaz,' 3 ' the Court held that Congress can condition receipt of medicare benefits on a set period of residency.' 3 2 Even
more recently, the Court has upheld citizenship requirements for police of134
ficers 133 and school teachers.
In light of these more recent decisions,13 5 it is submitted that the equal
protection afforded aliens under the Covenant is broader than that provided
by the Constitution. It should be noted, however, that the Court's position
that aliens may be barred from voting and holding public office' 3 6 is con3 7
sistent with article 25 of the Covenant which similarly limits these rights.'
A third area of conflict between the Covenant's guarantees of equal protection and the provisions of the Constitution is that of the degree of equality afforded illegitimates.' 3 8 In Levy v. Louisiana,139 the Court held that
illegitimates are persons within the meaning of the equal protection
clause, 140 and, utilizing a rationality standard,' 4 ' invalidated a state statute
permitting only legitimate children to maintain an action for the wrongful
death of a parent. 142 However, in a later case, Labine v. Vincent, 1 43 an
intestate succession provision which subordinated the rights of acknowledged
illegitimates to the rights of legitimate children and other relatives was up-

130. Sugarman v. Dougall,. 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973) (dictum). See also Boyd v. Thayer, 143
U.S. 135, 161 (1892).
131. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
132. Id. at 69, 87. The Court distinguished Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1970); note
126 and accompanying text supra, on the basis that, whereas the federal government had a
rational basis for distinguishing between American citizens and aliens, a state has no rational
basis for distinguishing between noncitizens from a different state (who were entitled to benefits
under the state statute), and noncitizens from a different nation (who were not entitled to
benefits). 426 U.S. at 84-85. An additional basis for distinguishing Matthews and Graham was
that "whereas the Constitution inhibits every state's power to restrict travel across its own
borders, Congress is explicitly empowered to exercise that type of control over travel across the
borders of the United States." Id. at 85.
133. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978).
134. Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589, 1596-97 (1979).
135. See notes 130-34 and accompanying text supra.
136. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973); notes 128-30 and accompanying text
supra.
137. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 25. The Covenant provides in
pertinent part: "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity ... to vote and be
elected at genuine periodic elections . . . [and] to have access, on general terms of equality, to
public service in his country." Id. (emphasis added).
138. The Covenant provides that the rights specified therein are to be ensured equally,
"without distinction [based upon] ... birth or other status." Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 1.
139. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
140. Id. at 70.
141. Id. at 71.
142. Id.at 72.
143. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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held. 144 A "denial of equal recovery" was subsequently declared unconstitutional in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 145 where it was held that
the claims of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates to death benefits
under a state workmen's compensation law could not be subordinated to the
14 6
claims of legitimate children.
In cases following Weber, the Court has required a showing of more
than mere rationality 147 to uphold a statute employing legitimacy based dis148
tinctions, but it has not submitted such statutes to the strictest scrutiny.
In Matthews v. Lucas, 149 for instance, the Court upheld a provision of the
Social Security Act which distinguished between legitimate children-who
were presumed to be entitled to receive funds-and illegitimate
children-who were obligated to present individual proof of their parentage. 150 It is constitutionally permissible, however, for a state to require
that the paternity of the father of an illegitimate child be judicially declared
sometime before the father's death as a precondition to the child's inheriting
by intestate succession. 151
Thus, in the illegitimacy area of equal protection, the Covenant and the
Constitution seem to be inconsistent. Although the Supreme Court has
stated that the scrutiny to be applied to legitimacy classifications is not
"toothless," 152 and that the classification is invalid under the fourteenth
53
amendment if it is not substantially related to permissible state interests,'
it is submitted that the "without distinctions" language from the Covenant
seemingly demands greater protection than the Court presently affords
under the Constitution.
It is therefore submitted that ratification of the Covenant will establish a
legal basis to afford women, aliens, and illegitimates greater rights than the
Constitution is presently interpreted to guarantee. Thus, before Congress
can consent to the Covenant, it must determine the advisability of expanding
these rights, and ascertain whether the Covenant affords the most advantageous means of accomplishing their expansion.

144. Id. at 539-40.
145. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
146. Id. at 175-76. The Weber Court distinguished this case and Levy from Labine on the
basis that in Weber and in Levy an insurmountable barrier was placed in the way of the child's
recovery, while in Labine the decedent could have overcome the barrier by providing for his
illegitimate child in a will. id. at 170-71.
147. In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), the Court stated: "The Equal Protection
Clause requires more than the mere incantation of proper state purpose." Id. at 769. The
Trimble Court invalidated a state statute which permitted legitimate children to inherit from
both parents, but only permitted illegitimates to inherit from their mother. Id. at 776.
148. See Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
149. id.
150. Id. at 510.
151. La~li v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1978).
152. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
153. 439 U.S. at 275.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 7
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

25: p. 119

B. Freedom of Expression
The Covenant's concept of freedom of expression is set forth in article
19, which provides: "Every one shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." 154 This
right to free speech appears to be largely consistent with the free speech
right recognized by the Constitution. 155 The Covenant further recognizes
that freedom of speech carries with it special duties and responsibilities, and
may be subject to certain restrictions. 1 56 Such restrictions are consistent
with the Constitution since freedom of speech is not an absolute freedom, as
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States: 157
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic. .

.

. The

question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. 158
Thus, both documents admit that freedom of expression may be subject to
some restrictions.
A variance between the Covenant and the Constitution may arise, however, when determining how much restriction is permissible. While the Covenant provides for restrictions necessary "for the respect of the rights or
reputation of others," 159 recent Supreme Court cases raise some questions
as to whether this qualification of the right of free speech for the protection
of reputation can be constitutionally tolerated.' 6 0 For instance, in Miami
154. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 19, para. 2.
155. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (first amendment guarantee extends
to freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1942) (the right of free speech and press includes the right to distribute, to receive,
and to read information). For the development of the first amendment right of free speech in
the Supreme Court, see generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 299 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 (1937).
156. Article 19 of the Covenant provides:
The exercise of the [right to freedom of expression] carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 19, para. 3.
157. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
158. 249 U.S. at 52 (citations omitted).
159. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 19, para. 3.
160. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 161-63 and
accompanying text infra.
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Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,161 the Court overturned a Florida statute
that granted candidates for political office, who are assailed regarding their
character or official record by any newspaper, a right to demand that the
newspaper print the candidate's reply to the charges. 162 Thus, according to
Tornillo, public figures such as candidates for office are not afforded protection of their personal reputation at the expense of another's freedom of expression.16 3 In view of this rationale, it is submitted that the Covenant may
limit the freedom of press presently recognized in the United States.
Another restriction that the Covenant imposes on the freedom of expression is that "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law," 164 It is not clear whether this section was intended to be
165
equivalent to the "clear and present danger" test announced in Schenck,
or whether it was intended to include speech that is less than a clear and
166
present danger of a serious substantive evil. In Terminiello v. Chicago,
the Supreme Court held that a speech which "vigorously, if not viciously,
criticized various political and racial groups" 167 was constitutionally protected. 168 Indeed, one function of speech recognized by the Court is to
invite dispute which necessarily creates unrest and dissatisfaction. 169 Therefore, depending upon how the Covenant's phrase "incitement to discrimination" is interpreted, another conflict between the Covenant and the Con1 70
stitution may arise.
A final, somewhat knotty problem exists with respect to reconciling the
free speech provisions of the Covenant and the Constitution. Article 5 of the
Covenant provides that no right that is recognized as fundamental by a

161. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
162. Id. at 258.
163. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court further held that a
public official is unable to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct, unless he shows that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 279-80. However, this stringent barrier to recovery for
libel was not extended to private persons. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974).
164. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 20, para. 2.
165. See notes 157-58 and accompanying text supra.
166. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Id.
170. The reasons for the Covenant's vagueness in the free speech area are understandable
when one compares this fledgling document to the Constitution which has endured for two
centuries and has been interpreted through a highly sophisticated development of case law.
Some degree of elasticity is necessary in a document that is not only young but binding on so
many nations of differing ideologies. With time, and through the influence of the member
states, the vagueness will be ameliorated by specific interpretation. It is submitted that, as a
partv to the Covenant, the United States would be provided with an invaluable opportunity to
influence the development of the Covenant in a direction paralleling American democratic
ideals through the process of interpretation and amplification of the document.
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member state may be restricted because the Covenant recognizes that right
to a lesser extent. 171 The apparent purpose of this provision is to prevent a
nation which protects a certain right to a greater extent than the Covenant
requires from using the adoption of the Covenant as an excuse to dilute its
own guarantee. The problem arises in that the Covenant appears to prefer
the right of reputation over that of free speech, 172 whereas the preference in
the United States is the reverse. 173 This places the United States, as a
potential signatory nation, in the quandary of attempting to accept two
mutually exclusive provisions-one preferring reputation over free speech,
and one forbidding any limitation of the exalted position free speech presently holds in the United States.
C. Rights of the Criminal Defendant
The Covenant provides the criminal defendant with many of the same
protections afforded by the Constitution, such as the right 1) to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty; 174 2) to the assistance of counsel; 175 3) to a
speedy trial; 176 4) to confrontation of witnesses; 177 5) against selfincrimination; 178 and 6) against double jeopardy. 179 The Covenant, however, also assures the criminal defendant certain rights which are not provided for in the Constitution, such as the right to have sentences reviewed
by a higher tribunal, 180 and the right to compensation if one's conviction is
reversed because it was the result of a miscarriage of justice. 18 1 Because
the rights afforded the criminal defendant under the Covenant may be
greater than those recognized in the United States, a determination must be
made as to whether the expansion of rights by way of this document is desirable.
The Covenant provides that "[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have
the right .

.

. to his sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according

to the law. 182 In the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, sentencing power is vested "solely within the discretion of the trial judge, with
appellate review available only to correct sentences which do not conform to

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
should
United
(1965).

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 5.
See note 159 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 160-63 and accompanying text supra.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 14, para. 2.
Id. art. 14, para. 3(b), (d).
Id. art. 14, para. 3(c).
Id. art. 14, para. 3(e).
Id. art. 14, para. 3(g).
Id. art. 14, para. 7.
Id. art. 14, para. 5.
Id. art. 14, para. 6.
Id. art. 14, para. 5. This section also deals with the right to appeal a conviction. It
be noted that this is presently a statutory right, rather than a constitutional right, in the
States. See Chanosky v. Building Supp. Co., 152 Conn. 449, 451, 208 A.2d 337, 339
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the statutory limits." 183 One commentary cites sentence disparity as a serious problem within the American criminal justice system because of this
total reliance upon the judge's discretion.'1 4 While various programs, such
as sentencing councils and institutes, have been set up to curb disparity and
improve the quality of sentencing decisions,"8 5 it is submitted that a more
direct solution to the problem of disparity in sentencing would be to adopt
the Covenant's approach of permitting appeals of sentences.
Should ratification of the Covenant prove to be impossible, however,
due to its current provisions relating to fundamental rights, the impasse
8 6
or by a reservation 187
could be overcome either by an understanding'
refusing to agree to a particular provision of the Covenant. But should the
United States decide to ratify the treaty, strong policy reasons militate
against the use of understandings and reservations. It is submitted that adoption of the Covenant with reservations may appear to the rest of the world as
a somewhat "half-hearted" affirmation of human rights, thus weakening
American leadership in this area. Such reservations and understandings
made on the part of the United States may provide other nations with a
precedent to qualify their acceptance of various essential human rights. It is
submitted that the benefits which would accrue from an unqualified reciprocal acceptance of the Covenant by all nations party thereto, would greatly
outweigh the burden of making the relatively minor changes in American
policy which are needed to permit an unconditional American acceptance of
88
the Covenant. '
IV. CONCLUSION

During the recent decades, the United States has resisted entrance into
multilateral human rights treaties. While the reasons for this hesitation are
numerous, it is suggested that many are meritless. Whether it be constitutional elitism that inhibits the United States from exchanging promises with
developing nations or an exaggerated fear of the treaty power's scope, the
real issue-the merits of the Covenant-is being overlooked. Fear that
treaties may override the Constitution and the concern that protection of
civil rights is a matter beyond the reach of treaties should not, it is submitted, be permitted to cloud the valid areas of concern, such as the policy
considerations in establishing world recognition of human rights. The real
area of investigation should be the specific provisions of the treaty in ques-

183. See A. GOLDSTEIN & S. ORLAND, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1176 (1974).
184. Id.
185. Id.

186. See note 83 supra.
187. See note 82 supra.
188. See generally MacDougal & Leighton, supra note 71, at 506.
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tion and their consistency with American legal processes and philosophy. It
is suggested that through ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the United States can become that much more influential in the
framing and enforcement of an international bill of rights. By failing to ratify,
advocacy of international human rights becomes a meaningless gesture by a
nation unwilling to recognize that national and world security demand that
human rights be safeguarded on an international level.
As Louis Henkin points out, now is the time "when all ability, flexibility, [and] wisdom are needed for cooperation for survival by a frightened
race, on a diminishing earth." 189 The time is ripe for the United States to
discover what it can gain from, as well as give to, the protection of human
rights by way of such treaties. The United States Constitution should not, it
is submitted, be a barrier, but an impetus to entrance into an agreement
such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights so that its principles may
be adopted worldwide.
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